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Abstract: More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of 
global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have 
nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This 
paper considers whether negotiations  can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively 
addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause sub-
stantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by 
paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). 
To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, 
participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must 
accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue 
that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives 
for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified 
with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having 
ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that 
characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent 
enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework 
Convention  on  Climate  Change,  but  also  in  the  framework  of  a  more  gradual  approach. 
Therefore,  one should  not  expect  climate  change negotiations  to  succeed in  producing an 
effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
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1. Introduction
More than 20 years of climate negotiations have pro-
duced a series of global climate agreements. Examples 
include the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992), the  Kyoto Protocol 
(Kyoto 1, 1997), the Marrakesh Accords (2001), the Bali 
Road Map (2007), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and 
the Durban Platform (2012), to mention only the most 
important ones.
Of course, these agreements differ significantly. Only 
the Kyoto Protocol  and the Copenhagen Accord are 
associated  with  specific  commitments  concerning 
emissions  reductions  or  limitations.  Whereas  Kyoto 
includes jointly determined and legally binding targets 
for  such  reductions  or  limitations,  the  Copenhagen 
Accord entails only unilaterally determined and non-
binding targets that are not even part of the text. The 
Marrakesh Accords are largely a companion agreement 
to  Kyoto,  with  specifications  concerning the  compli-
ance system and the flexibility mechanisms (emissions 
trading, joint implementation, and the green develop-
ment mechanism). Finally, the Bali Road Map and the 
Durban Platform essentially provide aims and guidance 
for further negotiations.
The many agreements over more than two decades 
notwithstanding, the climate negotiations have made 
very little progress in terms of curbing global emissions 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs). According to the Neth-
erlands Environmental Assessment Agency, global CO2 
emissions in 2010 exceeded the 2000 level by 33% 
and the 1990 level by 45% [1]. Hence, if anything, 
the growth in global emissions is accelerating.
What explains this striking lack of progress in the 
climate negotiations? Considering that the delegations 
to the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties consist of 
highly skilled experts and diplomats, it is unlikely that 
insufficient knowledge of the problem at hand or lack 
of innovative proposals for an effective design of the 
international climate regime explains the lack of pro-
gress. It seems far more promising to seek the ex-
planation at the structural level, as this paper does. In 
particular, we consider whether the constraints faced 
by the negotiators are so severe that it is unrealistic 
to expect that they can be overcome. In other words, 
we consider whether the global climate change nego-
tiations can succeed [2].
Providing  a  meaningful  answer  to  this  research 
question presupposes a clear definition of what success 
means. It is far from obvious what such a definition 
should look like; indeed, several conceivable success 
criteria exist.
A first possible criterion is simply to require that the 
negotiators  reach  an  agreement  (regardless  of  its 
contents). Any one of the aforementioned agreements 
(as well as any other conceivable agreement) would 
obviously count as a success based on this first criterion. 
Hence, this criterion is too weak to be interesting.
A second possible  criterion  is  that  to count as a 
success, the agreement negotiators reach must include 
commitments  for  emissions  reductions or  limitations 
by at least  some member countries. In terms of this 
second criterion, the Kyoto Protocol would count as a 
success,  because it  required 36 countries to reduce 
their  annual  emissions in  the period 2008−2012 by 
5.2% on average, compared to 1990 levels.
A  third  possible  criterion  is  that  the  agreement's 
design must make ratification politically feasible in all 
major  countries.  According  to  this  criterion,  Kyoto 
cannot be counted as a success, because it was not 
ratified  by  the  United  States,  the  world's  largest 
emitter  of  GHGs at  the time of  the Kyoto meeting. 
Indeed,  President  Clinton  did  not  even  submit  the 
treaty to the Senate, presumably because it had no 
chance of obtaining the Senate's consent [3].
Finally, a fourth possible success criterion is that the 
agreement must be  effective. An agreement is here 
deemed  effective  if  it  causes  substantial  emissions 
reductions either directly (in the agreement's own life-
time)  or  indirectly  (by  paving the  way  for  a  future 
agreement  that  causes  substantial  emissions  reduc-
tions directly) [4]. In this article, we use this fourth 
success criterion. We realize that the criterion is not 
particularly precise; however, for our purposes it is not 
of great importance whether reducing emissions "sub-
stantially"  means  meeting  the  2°C  target  (see  the 
next section), meeting a 3°C target, or meeting some 
other precise target. The point is that, according to 
this criterion, a successful agreement must be either 
directly or indirectly effective. Obviously and as already 
noted, the aforementioned agreements do not even 
come close to being directly effective—individually or 
collectively. Moreover, they do not include institutional 
arrangements  that  make  them  indirectly  effective 
either. If anything, current UNFCCC rules hinder rather 
than spur substantial global emissions reductions. For 
example,  the  1995  Berlin  Mandate  introduced  the 
principle  that  UNFCCC  parties  should  "protect  the 
climate system in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" 
[5]. This principle places the responsibility  for under-
taking emissions reductions squarely on the Annex I 
countries,  which  are  currently  responsible  for  only 
about 40% of global emissions.
We proceed as follows: in Section 2 we point out 
some reasons why the climate change problem is so 
difficult to solve. In Section 3 we consider the pro-
spects for a directly effective climate agreement. In 
particular,  we  maintain  that  the  key  to  a  directly 
effective  climate  agreement  is  potent  enforcement, 
and  contend  that  potent  enforcement  is  politically 
infeasible in the global UNFCCC framework. In Section 
4 we address the prospects for an indirectly effective 
agreement, arguing that obtaining substantial global 
emissions reductions through a more gradual (or club-
like) approach is also politically infeasible. Finally, in 
Section 5 we conclude.
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2. Why Is the Climate Change Problem so 
Difficult to Solve?
The  climate  change  problem  is  complex  in  both 
scientific and political terms. Over the last two and a 
half  decades,  much  energy  has  been  invested  in 
assessing its scientific aspects. The Intergovernmental 
Panel  on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 
1988, and has since published regular assessments of 
state-of-the-art  knowledge  on  the  climate  system's 
physical  aspects,  assessments  of  countries'  socio-
economic vulnerability to climate change, and assess-
ments of adaptation and mitigation options. While this 
process  has  met  criticism  (e.g.,  [6]),  policymakers 
seem largely to have accepted the IPCC's conclusion 
that anthropogenic emissions of GHGs are associated 
with a risk of human-induced climate change. In 2009, 
for instance, climate negotiators at the Copenhagen 
meeting (the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Cli-
mate Convention, COP-15) recognized "the scientific 
view that the increase in global temperature should be 
below 2 degrees Celsius" (Copenhagen Accord, para-
graph 1). Policymakers further agreed that "deep cuts 
in global emissions are required according to science" 
and that they would "take action to meet this objective 
[the 2°C target, authors]" (Copenhagen Accord, para-
graph 2) [7]. So far, however, policymakers have been 
unable  to  agree  on  how  to  achieve  the  necessary 
emissions reductions to meet this target.
Several  factors  contribute  to  making  the  climate 
change problem difficult to solve. Firstly, climate mit-
igation  resembles  a  global  public  good.  Thus,  no 
country can be excluded from enjoying the benefits of 
climate mitigation, even if it fails to contribute to such 
mitigation. This aspect of global public goods means 
that most of the benefits from a country's own mitiga-
tion efforts go to others. Indeed, a major motivation 
for a country to participate in climate cooperation is to 
ensure that the net costs of its own mitigation efforts 
are outweighed by the benefits it derives from mitigation 
efforts in other countries. Moreover, the contributions 
of most individual countries to climate mitigation, es-
pecially those of small countries, matter little for the 
global climate. For example, even if Norway were to 
eliminate all of its emissions of GHGs, global emissions 
would become only about 0.15% smaller than if Nor-
way were to continue business as usual. The effect on 
global warming would thus hardly be noticeable.
Secondly, a significant time lag exists between the 
costs of implementing GHG emissions reductions and 
the benefits of climate mitigation effects. While costs 
are incurred immediately, it may take decades until a 
measure's benefits take effect [8]. In contrast, policy-
makers typically have a much shorter time perspective 
and tend to favor measures associated with immediate 
benefits and delayed costs. Policymakers will  always 
have good reasons for delaying action on long-term 
problems; in particular, they will often want to prioritize 
more immediate societal challenges (e.g., the financial 
crisis,  the  debt  crisis,  health  care,  seniors'  welfare, 
etc.).  Furthermore,  depending  on  how long  climate 
benefits take to materialize, not all the people carry-
ing  the  costs  will  enjoy  the  benefits.  This  disparity 
might cause policymakers to delay action.
These two factors  imply  that  the climate  change 
problem involves  a  free-rider  problem.  Actors  have 
strong incentives to enjoy the benefits of other actors' 
mitigation efforts while not contributing to mitigation 
themselves.  Climate  mitigation  will  thus  likely  be 
provided only in suboptimal quantities.
Thirdly,  GHG  emissions  reductions  on  the  scale 
necessary  to  solve  the  climate  change problem are 
very costly because almost all economic activities are 
associated with GHG emissions. Of course,  some cli-
mate  measures  may  be  economically  beneficial  in 
their own right. For instance, investments in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency may create new jobs, 
reduce  energy  costs,  and  increase  energy  security. 
Therefore,  many  countries  have  adopted  climate 
measures  even  in  the  absence  of  an  international 
agreement. These types of measures, however, are in-
sufficient to generate the scope of emissions reduc-
tions required for effective climate mitigation. Moreover, 
which climate measures are economically beneficial is 
strongly linked to country-specific economic conditions. 
Thus, an effective international agreement must require 
countries to implement emissions reductions  beyond 
the scope of measures that are beneficial in their own 
right within the framework of each country's economy. 
It must also include costly reduction measures even 
for the most carbon-intensive sectors. At that point, 
conflicts over burden sharing set in and incentives to 
free  ride  take  effect.  Climate  measures  that  are 
beneficial in their own right, therefore, do little to help 
overcome the barriers to global collective action. On 
the contrary, they may arguably contribute to legitim-
ize free riding.
The current energy and climate policy debate in the 
EU illustrates the continuing significance of emissions 
reduction costs. The EU has pursued ambitious climate 
policies for more than a decade and has had an oper-
ative  Emissions  Trading  Scheme  (ETS)  since  2005. 
Nevertheless,  the  costs  associated  with  ambitious 
climate policies are still a key concern in the climate 
and energy policy debate. In May 2013, the EU heads 
of state declared that "EU policy must ensure 'compet-
itive' energy prices" and recognized a need to diversify 
the EU's "indigenous energy resources" to include not 
only renewable energies but also coal, nuclear power, 
and shale gas. German member of the European Parlia-
ment, Holger Krahmer responded, "for the first time, 
rising energy costs and the declining competitiveness 
of the European economy will be rated higher than ob-
viously unenforceable global climate change ambitions" 
[9]. Moreover, the director of BUSINESSEUROPE blamed 
"the cost of climate policies—such as the ETS, renew-
able  energy  support  schemes, and  the  structure  of 
electricity markets—for the bloc's flagging economy" [9].
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The costs associated with GHG emissions reductions 
imply that the free-rider problem is even more severe 
for the climate problem than for other environmental 
problems. The point is well illustrated by Canada's En-
vironment Minister, Peter Kent, who justified Canada's 
withdrawal  from the Kyoto Protocol  in  the following 
way: "the transfer of $14 billion from Canadian tax-
payers  to  other countries—the equivalent  of  $1,600 
from every Canadian family—with no impact on emis-
sions  or  the  environment.  That's  the  Kyoto  cost  to 
Canadians" [10]. Given that actors will likely implement 
the least costly measures first, moreover, the cost of 
new measures will tend to increase, which reinforces 
incentives to free ride.
Fourth,  domestic  politics  tend  to  give  the  upper 
hand to opponents of implementing climate mitigation 
measures.  Whatever  few  benefits  such  measures 
provide to domestic constituents are long-term, vague, 
and highly dispersed. They thus give little  incentive 
for political action. In contrast, costs are often near-
term, salient, and highly concentrated. They are thus 
more  likely  to  result  in  efforts  to  influence  policy-
makers (e.g., [11]).
Finally,  a  number  of  strong  asymmetries  further 
aggravate the climate change problem. Countries vary 
greatly  concerning  their  historical  responsibility  for 
causing  the  problem,  concerning  their  sensitivity  to 
climate  change,  and  concerning  their  capacities  for 
mitigation and adaptation. These asymmetries partly 
explain why debates about justice or equity tend to be 
contaminated by "self-serving bias", that is, countries 
tend  to  invoke  distributional  principles  that  favor 
themselves. These asymmetries make difficult a con-
sensus on what a just climate agreement would look 
like, and make justifying free-riding behavior easy.
Given all these factors, the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto 1) 
was  unsurprisingly  associated  with  several  types  of 
free riding [12]: firstly, the United States did not ratify. 
Secondly, Canada ratified but subsequently withdrew 
from the agreement. Thirdly, "hot air" countries such 
as  Belarus,  Russia,  and  Ukraine  participated  with 
rather lenient emissions control commitments. Fourthly, 
developing  countries  (including  countries  such  as 
China  and  India)  participated  without  emissions 
control  commitments.  Finally,  some  countries  may 
have participated without complying (fully) with their 
commitments.  Whether  some did  (and  if  so,  which 
ones) is not known at the time of writing. Kyoto 1, 
moreover,  imposed relatively  small  emission cuts on 
Annex  I  countries  [13] (and  none  at  all  on  other 
member countries). A future agreement with a higher 
ambition  level  would  give  actors  even  stronger 
incentives to free ride.
3. The Feasibility of a Directly Effective Climate 
Agreement
To be effective (in the sense outlined in Section 1), a 
new climate agreement must cause substantial global 
emissions reductions either directly or indirectly. Here 
we  focus  on  the  prospects  for  a  directly  effective 
agreement,  while  we consider  the  prospects  for  an 
indirectly effective agreement in Section 5.
3.1. Conditions for a Directly Effective Climate  
Agreement
To  cause  substantial  global  emissions  reductions 
directly,  an  agreement  must  satisfy  three  main 
criteria.  Firstly,  participation  must  be  both compre-
hensive and stable. While it may be difficult to specify 
exactly what counts as comprehensive, the number of 
participating countries  is  clearly  less  important  than 
the participating countries' share of global GHG emis-
sions.  Whereas  emissions  in  tiny  countries  such  as 
Lichtenstein, San Marino, and Andorra are largely in-
consequential for global warming, the G20 countries 
are  responsible  for  approximately  80%  of  global 
emissions [14]. Thus, a new climate agreement ratified 
by all G20 countries would go far towards satisfying 
the comprehensiveness condition. However, even an 
agreement with comprehensive membership may not 
be very helpful unless the membership is also stable: 
the  ratifiers  must  remain  members  throughout  the 
agreement's lifetime. For example, the Kyoto Protocol 
was unstable in the sense that Canada withdrew in 
December 2011. Moreover, other countries participating 
in Kyoto 1 have followed Canada's example by making 
clear they will not participate in Kyoto 2.
Secondly, participating countries must accept deep 
commitments, that is, they must promise substantial 
emissions  reductions.  It  is  well  known  that  some 
international  environmental  agreements  (IEAs)  are 
shallow, in that participants promise little more than 
business as usual [15,16]. In contrast, to be effective, 
a  climate  agreement  must  require  participants  to 
deviate extensively from business-as-usual emissions 
trajectories.  Because  almost  all  economic  activity 
entails GHG emissions, such deviations will  likely be 
very costly (e.g., [17]).
Finally,  the  agreement  must  display  high compli-
ance rates, that is, participating countries must actually 
implement their deep commitments. The more costly 
such implementation, the less likely that high compli-
ance rates will emerge (other things being equal).
Given  the  strong  incentives  for  free  riding  (see 
Section 2), it is unlikely that all of these three condi-
tions  can  be  fulfilled  in  a  new  climate  agreement 
unless  that  agreement  includes  potent  enforcement 
measures.
3.2. The Key to an Effective Agreement: Potent  
Enforcement
While  "enforcement"  is  often  defined  in  terms  of 
negative incentives ("sticks"), we here follow Breitmeier 
et al. [18], who broaden the enforcement concept to 
include positive incentives ("carrots") as well. We thus 
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define "enforcement" as the promise, threat, or actual 
use of positive or negative incentives to induce coun-
tries to behave (or abstain from behaving) in a certain 
way [19].
An effective climate  agreement will  require  three 
types of enforcement: (1) incentives for countries to 
ratify  with  deep  commitments,  (2)  incentives  for 
ratifiers with deep commitments to abstain from with-
drawal, and (3) incentives for ratifiers with deep com-
mitments to comply with them.
Including  measures  for  these  three  types  of 
enforcement is not enough, however. The enforcement 
measures must also be potent, that is, they must be 
able to actually modify the behavior of would-be free 
riders. Such ability requires that enforcement measures 
be both credible and sufficiently big. Sticks are suffi-
ciently big if would-be free riders would rather refrain 
from free riding and go unpunished than free ride and 
suffer punishment. Carrots are sufficiently big if would-
be free riders would rather refrain from free riding and 
receive the promised reward than free ride and not 
receive it.
Stick measures are credible if other participants (or 
an enforcement institution erected and empowered by 
participants)  can be  expected  to  actually  use  them 
against free-riding countries. Similarly, carrot measures 
are credible if other participants (or an enforcement 
institution) can be expected to actually provide them 
to countries that do not free ride.
We emphasize that including one or two types of 
enforcement, but not the third, will likely be of limited 
help. For example, an agreement that includes potent 
type 2 and type 3 incentives, but not potent type 1 
incentives, would likely face great difficulties in per-
suading all  major  countries  to  ratify  (or  at  least  to 
ratify with deep commitments). Similarly, an agreement 
that includes potent type 1 and type 3 incentives, but 
not potent type 2 incentives, would likely experience 
considerable withdrawals. Finally, an agreement that 
provides potent type 1 and type 2 incentives, but not 
potent type 3 incentives,  would likely witness wide-
spread noncompliance.
In short, were an ambitious climate agreement to 
include only one or  two types of  potent incentives, 
enforcement  would  largely  shift  free-riding behavior 
from  categories  for  which  the  agreement  includes 
potent  enforcement  (say,  noncompliance  and  with-
drawal) to categories for which the agreement provides 
no  enforcement  (say,  nonratification  or  ratification 
with a shallow commitment). Enforcement would then 
add little to the agreement's effectiveness (e.g., [20]). 
An effective climate agreement must therefore block 
all escape options for would-be free riders by provid-
ing potent enforcement of all three types.
While potent enforcement is essential for an effect-
ive climate agreement, it is not equally important for 
making other IEAs effective. Although only relatively 
few IEAs include potent enforcement measures, it is 
well known (e.g., see [21]) that many IEAs experience 
high compliance rates (however,  it  is  also true that 
some IEAs have witnessed considerable noncompliance
—the Gothenburg Protocol under the Convention on 
Long-range  Transboundary  Air  Pollution  provides  an 
example).  At  least  four  factors  may  explain  high 
compliance rates in IEAs without potent enforcement 
(e.g.,  see  [22]).  Firstly,  IEAs  aiming to  solve  a  co-
ordination game rather than a social  dilemma game 
provide no incentives for noncompliance. Secondly, we 
should also expect high compliance rates for shallow 
dilemma-game  IEAs,  where  member  countries  are 
committed  to  little  more  than  business  as  usual. 
Thirdly,  even  deep  dilemma-game  IEAs  may  obtain 
high compliance (and participation) rates if the prob-
lem size  is  moderate,  so that  compliance  costs  are 
also moderate. In such cases, the legal  principle of 
pacta  sunt  servanda and  other  cooperation  norms 
may well overcome the incentive to free ride. Finally, 
in  dilemma-game IEAs  without  potent  incentives  to 
ratify,  would-be free riders will  likely opt out of the 
agreement,  meaning  that  only  countries  able  and 
willing  to  fulfill  their  commitments  will  participate. 
Importantly,  climate change constitutes a  large  and 
extremely  malign  social  dilemma that  involves  very 
high  costs  because  virtually  all  economic  activities 
entail  GHG emissions (see Section 2). The need for 
potent enforcement will  therefore likely be consider-
ably larger for an (ambitious) climate agreement than 
for almost any other IEA.
3.3. Kyoto: A Climate Agreement without Potent  
Enforcement
The  requirement  that  enforcement  must  be  potent 
might seem self-evident; however, Kyoto's enforcement 
system illustrates that enforcement institutions might 
fall significantly short of meeting the requirement that 
an effective agreement must include potent incentives 
of all three types.
Firstly, while Kyoto (or rather, its companion agree-
ment,  the  Marrakesh  Accords  from  2001)  included 
incentives for compliance enforcement (type 3 incent-
ives),  it  did  not  include  incentives  for  countries  to 
abstain from withdrawal  (type  2 incentives).  Hence, 
Canada could essentially withdraw from Kyoto at little 
or no cost.
Secondly, neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Mar-
rakesh Accords  includes  any  incentives  for  inducing 
countries  to  ratify  Kyoto.  Such  incentives  were 
nevertheless used informally by some Kyoto members 
vis-à-vis some other Annex I countries. In particular, 
while initially hesitant, Russia eventually ratified Kyoto 
in return for the EU's dropping its objections against 
Russia's  joining  the  World  Trade  Organization  [23]. 
After the United States' repudiation, Kyoto could not 
have entered into force without Russian ratification, 
because  entry  into  force  required  ratification  by  at 
least  55  countries  responsible,  in  total,  for  at  least 
55% of the 1990 emissions in Annex I countries. After 
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the U.S. repudiation of Kyoto, the latter requirement 
could not be met without Russian ratification.
Finally,  the  compliance  incentives  included in  the 
Marrakesh Accords suffer from severe problems. The 
Accords  specify  that  countries  failing  to  submit 
sufficient permits to cover their emissions in the first 
commitment  period  (2008–2012)  face  two  main 
consequences:
1. They must compensate for their excess emissions 
in  the  second  commitment  period  (which  has 
now been set to 2013–2020).  Moreover,  in  the 
second commitment period, noncompliant coun-
tries must reduce their emissions by an additional 
30%  of  their  surplus  in  the  first  commitment 
period. These emissions reductions come on top 
of  whatever  noncompliant  countries'  emissions 
reductions commitments might be for the second 
commitment period;
2. They  will  have  their  eligibility  to  participate  in 
emissions trading suspended until  this eligibility 
is reinstated by the Enforcement Branch of the 
Compliance  Committee.  In  practice,  suspension 
means that they will be unable to sell (but can 
buy) emission permits.
A main problem with the first consequence is that it 
essentially requires noncompliant countries to punish 
themselves  [17].  Furthermore,  this  self-punishment 
requirement is voluntary in a three-fold sense. Firstly, 
the obligation to  undertake additional  emissions re-
ductions is not legally binding. Secondly, no second-
order punishment exists for failure to implement the 
punishment. In other words, noncompliant countries 
risk nothing for failing to punish themselves. Thirdly, 
the  consequence  presupposes  that  noncompliant 
countries will voluntarily continue as members in the 
second  commitment  period.  Noncompliant  countries 
can thus  escape punishment by  simply  withdrawing 
from the treaty. As already mentioned, Canada with-
drew from Kyoto before the first commitment period 
ended,  whereas  several  other  countries  (Belarus, 
Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and Ukraine) have de-
clined to participate in Kyoto 2.
The  second  consequence  does  not  rely  on  self-
punishment, because the climate regime controls who 
can and who cannot legitimately participate in emis-
sions trading. Indeed, emissions trading makes little 
sense unless approved by the climate regime. Never-
theless,  even  this  consequence  lacks  "bite":  to  sell 
emissions permits, a country must have a surplus of 
permits. In contrast, a noncompliant country will have 
a deficit of permits and will thus have no permits to 
sell. At best, therefore, the second consequence con-
tributes  to  preventing  noncompliant  countries  from 
illegally selling permits they do not have.
Because Kyoto's enforcement system is so lacking 
in potency, it is practically useless as a deterrent of 
excess emissions and will unlikely have much influence 
on  member  countries'  compliance.  However,  in  the 
case  of  Kyoto,  the  absence  of  potent  enforcement 
may  not  have  made  much  of  a  difference.  Firstly, 
Kyoto aimed only at  moderate  emissions reductions 
(on average about 5.2% reduction in Annex I coun-
tries, compared to 1990 levels); thus, incentives for 
noncompliance were correspondingly moderate.
Secondly,  the  economic  downturn  following  the 
financial  crisis  contributed  significantly  to  limiting 
emissions in the 2008–2012 period, thereby reducing 
the  cost  of  compliance  in  Kyoto's  first  commitment 
period even further.
Thirdly, for many or even most of the 36 countries 
with a legally binding emissions reduction or limitation 
commitment we should expect high compliance rates 
for  reasons  that  have  nothing  to  do  with  Kyoto's 
enforcement system. Twenty-seven of these 36 coun-
tries are EU members and 3 additional countries are 
members of the European Economic Area (EEA). The 
EU  has  strong  ambitions  to  act  as  an  international 
leader on climate change mitigation, and can rely on 
far  more  potent  means  of  enforcement  than  Kyoto 
can. Examples include the European Court of Justice 
and the very potent enforcement measures included 
in the EU ETS (e.g., see [24]). Moreover, of the re-
maining six Kyoto countries with a binding emissions 
reduction  or  limitation  commitment,  three  (Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine) received a large surplus of permits 
("hot  air")  because  of  their  transition  to  a  market 
economy following the fall of the communist regimes 
around 1990 (the same is true for the eight former 
communist  countries  that  are  now  EU  members). 
Thus,  these  countries  did  not  have to  actively  limit 
their emissions to reach compliance. Also, Japan was 
probably exceptionally  motivated to comply because 
of the name and origin of the Kyoto Protocol.
Finally,  participation  in  Kyoto  was  completely 
voluntary  in  that  no  incentives  were  included  for 
ratification or against withdrawal. Countries that parti-
cipate voluntarily in an IEA will likely display a reason-
ably high motivation for compliance [25].
All these factors suggest that Kyoto enjoyed quite 
favorable  conditions  concerning  compliance  rates. 
Nevertheless, based on emissions data excluding land 
use, land use changes, and forestry (LULUCF) for the 
2008–2010 period, Haita found that no less than 15 
member  countries  had  on  average  exceeded  their 
yearly national quota ([26], p. 2). Seemingly, for at 
least  some  of  them,  only  creative  accounting  or 
massive acquisition of credits through emissions trad-
ing, joint implementation, and the clean development 
mechanism  in  the  commitment  period's  final  two 
years would make compliance possible [27].
That  Kyoto struggled to  achieve high compliance 
rates despite the many favorable conditions underlines 
the  importance  of  potent  enforcement.  To  ensure 
comprehensive  and  stable  participation  in  a  more 
effective future climate agreement, incentives for rati-
fication with deep commitments and incentives against 
withdrawal  may  be  necessary.  Countries  induced to 
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participate  through  such  incentives  may  well  drag 
their feet concerning compliance unless the agreement 
also includes potent compliance enforcement. Hence, 
including incentives for ratification and against with-
drawal  will  likely  enhance  the  need  for  compliance 
enforcement [24,28]. This hypothesis is consistent with 
our earlier claim that including only one or two forms 
of  enforcement—but  not  all  three—will  unlikely  add 
much to an agreement's effectiveness.
3.4. Potent Enforcement: An Example
If  Kyoto's  enforcement  system  is  impotent,  what 
might  a  potent  enforcement  system look  like?  Pro-
posed  alternatives  include  enforcement  via  GHG 
abatement  reductions,  trade  restrictions,  or  by  re-
stricting access  to  R&D cooperation.  However,  such 
systems often fail to meet the conditions for a potent 
enforcement  system  discussed  in  Section  3.2,  and 
would therefore be incapable of deterring free riding 
[29]. This section considers an example of a simple 
yet potent enforcement system that could in principle 
be incorporated into a new climate agreement. Based 
on deposits, this system would provide big and cred-
ible  incentives  for  compliance  and  could  easily  be 
adapted to provide equally big and credible incentives 
against withdrawal. However, although in theory the 
system could also be designed to provide big incentives 
for ratification with deep commitments, these incent-
ives would unlikely be credible in practice. The system 
would  therefore  require  that  other  measures  (e.g., 
some kind of trade restrictions) be added to provide 
potent incentives for ratification with deep commitments.
Several  scholars  (e.g.,  [29-35])  have  considered 
possibly enforcing a new climate agreement through a 
deposit-refund system. The design of such a system 
must take into account the type of climate agreement 
concerned; here we consider a design for a cap-and-
trade  agreement  (e.g.,  [29,36]).  Essentially,  each 
member country must (1) deposit a significant sum of 
hard currency at ratification and (2) make additional 
periodic deposits until the commitment period begins. 
When it ends, a country that makes all required de-
posits  and meets  its  emissions limitation  target  will 
receive a full refund. In contrast, a country that fails 
to make further required deposits or fails to reach its 
target  will  lose  all  or  part  of  its  existing  deposits, 
depending  on  the  degree  of  its  noncompliance. 
Provided  that  for  each  country  the  total  deposits 
exceed the cost of reaching the target, this deposit-
refund system will effectively deter excess emissions.
As  an  instrument  for  compliance  enforcement,  a 
deposit-refund  system has  several  advantages  [29]. 
Firstly,  it  is  simple.  Whereas  Kyoto's  compliance 
enforcement system is fairly complex, almost anyone 
can understand a system whereby excess emissions 
will  entail  loss  of  deposits.  Secondly,  unlike  Kyoto's 
reliance on self-punishment,  confiscation of deposits 
does  not  require  self-damaging  cooperation  by  the 
country  concerned,  because  the  climate  regime will 
control deposits. Thirdly, provided that each country's 
total deposits exceed its costs of reaching its target, 
the punishment for noncompliance will be sufficiently 
big: fulfilling commitments and receiving a full refund 
will be better than being noncompliant and forfeiting 
(part of) deposits. Finally, the threatened punishment 
will also be credible: punishing a noncompliant party 
will  benefit  other  parties  individually  as  well  as 
collectively.
Under Kyoto, a noncompliant country could escape 
punishment simply by withdrawing (as Canada did). 
In contrast, a deposit-refund system could easily be 
designed  to  make  such  escape  unprofitable.  For 
example, the agreement could specify that upon with-
drawing, a member country forfeits some (or even all) 
of its deposits.
What about incentives for ratification? In theory, a 
deposit-refund system may also be designed to induce 
countries to ratify. In particular, in a symmetric setting 
(i.e., all countries are identical), a clause could specify 
that  the  treaty  will  not  enter  into  force  until  all 
countries  have ratified with  deep  commitments  and 
made the required deposits [29]. Such a clause would 
effectively  make  free  riding  by  not  ratifying  (or  by 
ratifying without a deep commitment) infeasible.
In  practice,  however,  a  deposit-refund  system is 
implausible as an instrument for inducing ratification. 
Firstly,  the  climate  change  problem is  entangled  in 
many  and  serious  asymmetries  (e.g.,  [37]),  which 
makes requiring all countries to participate extremely 
impractical. Secondly, the multiple asymmetries make 
unlikely a consensus on relaxing the universal particip-
ation requirement: permitting some (major) countries 
to free ride would unlikely obtain unanimous consent. 
Thirdly, relaxing the unanimous ratification requirement 
could undermine the incentive to join; indeed, if an 
agreement requires only partial participation and does 
not provide other incentives for participation, a deposit-
refund  system  could  even  undermine  cooperation 
[34,35]. Fourthly, it may not be credible that if one 
country declines to make the deposit required upon 
ratification, other countries will abstain from cooperat-
ing among themselves. Yet, in a deposit-refund sys-
tem,  the  incentive  to  ratify  and  make  deposits 
critically hinges on such credibility. Finally,  countries 
facing serious liquidity problems (e.g., several southern 
European countries) may be particularly reluctant to 
participate  in  a  climate  treaty  based  on  a  deposit-
refund system.
In conclusion, a deposit-refund system could provide 
sufficiently big and credible incentives for compliance 
and  against  withdrawal.  It  could  also  solve  many 
problems associated with Kyoto's enforcement system. 
However,  a  deposit-refund  system  provides  less 
powerful incentives for ratification with deep commit-
ments.  It  must  therefore  be  combined  with  other 
measures, such as a set of (carefully selected) trade 
restrictions, to induce comprehensive participation [38].
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An agreement with a deposit-refund system would 
also  have  to  overcome  other  challenges.  Member 
countries would face uncertainty concerning the size 
of the required deposits. They must ensure that the 
risk  of  deposits  being  lost  be  no  bigger  than  the 
corresponding risk for alternative investments. Some 
countries (such as Norway) may be able to pay the 
deposits; countries with severe liquidity problems may 
not be able to pay them, at least not until the finan-
cial crisis ends.
These and other practical challenges may or may 
not have practical solutions; however, for the sake of 
argument, let us assume that they are solvable or that 
someone conceives of potent enforcement that entails 
no unsolvable practical challenges. The question would 
still remain: is potent enforcement politically feasible?
3.5. Is Potent Enforcement Politically Feasible within  
the UNFCCC?
Decision rules, that is, the level of support required for 
collective decisions, are a key determinant of political 
feasibility [39]. Climate negotiations take place within 
the UNFCCC, which operates under consensus rules. 
These decision rules give veto power to the most reluct-
ant countries. The consensus requirement is not always 
taken literally.  At the 18th Conference of the Parties 
(COP-18) in Doha in 2012, for instance, protests from 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were ignored 
when  the  Doha  decisions  were  adopted  (see,  e.g., 
[40]). However, such occasional "liberal" implementation 
of the consensus principle does not solve the problem 
of giving veto power to the most reluctant countries; at 
best, such implementation might postpone it.
Countries  that  are  generally  negative  towards  a 
deep agreement will  likely  oppose potent  incentives 
for  ratification  and  potent  incentives  against  with-
drawal.  Countries  uncertain about their own willing-
ness or  ability  to implement  their  commitments will 
likely  oppose  potent  enforcement  of  compliance. 
Furthermore, the deeper the commitments, the larger 
the need for potent enforcement and the more likely 
that  some  countries  will  oppose  such  enforcement 
[11]. As long as some of the UNFCCC's 195 parties 
are  unprepared  to  consent  to  deep  commitments 
and/or potent enforcement, a climate agreement which 
includes all three types of enforcement required for an 
agreement to be effective is politically infeasible. For 
example, India is currently unprepared to consent to 
an  agreement  with  deep  commitments  and  potent 
enforcement, as illustrated by the following statement: 
"developing  countries  need  not  have  a  compliance 
regime even though the new treaty or Arrangement 
could apply to all Parties. This is because the targets 
of  developing countries  will  need to  continue to  be 
voluntary" [41]. A climate agreement with deep com-
mitments  and  potent  enforcement  mechanisms  will 
therefore be politically infeasible if negotiated within 
the UNFCCC framework (or, for that matter, within any 
other global forum based on unanimity).
4. The Feasibility of an Indirectly Effective 
Climate Agreement
We  now  turn  to  the  prospects  for  an  indirectly 
effective  climate  agreement.  As  noted  above,  CO2 
emissions  are  unevenly  distributed  among  UNFCCC 
parties: fewer than 20 countries are responsible for 
more than 80% of global emissions [42]. Also, there 
is a principal difference between the three enforcement 
types.  Clearly,  all  three  will  likely  require  unanimity 
among  the  negotiating  parties.  However,  whereas 
incorporating  incentives  for  compliance  and  against 
withdrawal  will  also  require  unanimity  amongst  the 
affected countries, incentives for ratification with deep 
commitments  can be  incorporated  without requiring 
unanimity  amongst  affected  countries  ([43],  p.  4). 
Thus, even if an effective all-party climate agreement 
with  potent  enforcement  mechanisms  is  politically 
infeasible in the UNFCCC context, a gradual approach 
to establishing an effective all-party agreement might 
nevertheless be feasible.
A possible way to proceed could be as follows: first 
negotiate a deep agreement with incentives for com-
pliance  and  against  withdrawal  amongst  an  initial 
coalition  of  willing  key  actors,  and  then  elicit  the 
participation of reluctant countries (i.e., countries that 
would not have consented to the agreement, had they 
participated in negotiating it) by incorporating incentives 
to ratify with deep commitments ([43], p. 4). Whether 
a  country  may  be  considered  "key"  in  this  context 
depends on two factors: the first is its share of global 
emissions, which reflects its significance in mitigating 
climate  change.  The second is  its  economic  power, 
which reflects its capacity to implement measures that 
can effectively induce reluctant parties to participate. 
In climate negotiations, however, these features over-
lap in  that  the  largest  emitters  also  generally  have 
very large economies.
In 2008, seven actors were responsible for 73% of 
global CO2 emissions: China (23%), the United States 
(19%),  the  EU  (13%),  India  (6%),  Russia  (6%), 
Japan (4%), and Canada (2%) [44]. Thus, a climate 
agreement that includes these seven would control a 
very  large  share  of  global  emissions  and  have tre-
mendous economic leverage. However, the number of 
key actors could be even further restricted to include 
only China and the United States. Between them, they 
account  for  42% of  global  CO2 emissions  [43]  and 
more than 30% of world GDP [45]. If they were to 
agree on deep commitments to reduce GHG emissions 
and  on  potent  mechanisms  to  enforce  compliance, 
they would likely have the economic strength to induce 
reluctant countries to join, for instance by implement-
ing  trade  restrictions  against  nonparticipants.  The 
question is: can they reach such an agreement?
Since 2005−2006, we have seen a development in 
China towards more ambitious domestic climate policies, 
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including significant investments in renewable energy 
sources (solar, wind power, and hydroelectric power) 
and  energy  efficiency.  China  has  also  introduced  a 
national resources tax that includes fossil energy re-
sources [46]. Prior to the COP-15 in Copenhagen, China 
announced an unconditional national carbon intensity 
reduction target of  40−45% from its  2005 level  by 
2020 [47]. So far, however, these domestic develop-
ments  have  not  translated  into  a  more  ambitious 
Chinese approach at the international level. Since the 
climate issue surfaced on the international agenda in 
the late 1980s, China has consistently argued that it 
will not commit to international GHG reduction targets 
until developed countries (notably the United States) 
demonstrate  willingness  and  ability  to  reduce  their 
GHG emissions. Whether domestic developments may 
evoke changes in China's future international position 
is difficult to assess. On the one hand, China increas-
ingly  recognizes  its  vulnerability  to  climate  change, 
which implies a stronger interest in a potent interna-
tional agreement to mitigate climate change. On the 
other hand, however, China's domestic climate measures 
also  seem motivated by  the  government's  effort  to 
restructure China's economic model and may be bene-
ficial  in  their  own right  [47].  Conrad thus suggests 
that for China, "strapping itself into the confines of an 
international  climate  framework  including  binding 
emission  reductions…comes with great  political  risk" 
[47]. In the Copenhagen negotiations, China adopted 
its traditional position that the main responsibility for 
abating the climate problem lies with developed coun-
tries. This position was reiterated later. In a February 
2012 joint statement, the BASIC group, which is the 
main coalition of large developing countries or "emer-
ging  economies"  [48],  stated:  "developed  countries 
must rise up to their historical responsibilities and take 
the lead in the fight against climate change…in ac-
cordance with the principles of equity  and common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective cap-
abilities under the Convention" [49]. Equally important 
in this context is that China is opposed to any climate 
agreement negotiated outside the UNFCCC framework. 
In a position paper prior to COP-15 in Copenhagen in 
2009, China stated, "the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol 
constitute the basic framework and legal basis for in-
ternational cooperation to address climate change" [50].
Even  if  China  should  be  prepared  to  undertake 
substantial  GHG emissions  mitigation,  however,  it  is 
unlikely that China would also be prepared to accept 
potent  enforcement  mechanisms.  China's  position is 
that developing countries (including China) should not 
be required to take on quantified emissions reduction 
commitments, but may voluntarily agree to "Nationally 
Appropriate Mitigation Actions" initiated by themselves, 
enabled through technological and financial transfers 
by developed countries, and exempt from any form of 
enforcement measures [51-53]. China's resistance to 
potent enforcement can in part be traced to concerns 
with preserving national sovereignty, and in part with 
a general reluctance to incorporating potent enforce-
ment unless prospects for compliance are certain [51]. 
Regarding enforcement of ratification, the BASIC coun-
tries,  including China,  "are concerned that unilateral 
trade restrictions (i.e., any type of trade restriction not 
agreed  on  unanimously  by  all  UNFCCC  parties) will 
distort  international  trade,  thereby  undermining eco-
nomic development in developing countries" ([43], p. 15).
The United States, on the other hand, is reluctant 
to join an international climate agreement that does 
not include GHG emissions control  targets  for  large 
developing  countries  (notably  China).  The  United 
States accepted the principle of "common but differ-
entiated responsibilities" adopted in the UNFCCC (Art-
icle 4.1), but it opposes a continued practice whereby 
countries  (such  as  China)  are  exempted  from GHG 
control  measures,  as  the  Senate's  1997 Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution made clear. It declares:
"the United States should not be a signatory to any 
protocol…which would…mandate new commitments 
to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the 
Annex  I  Parties  [i.e.,  Developed  Country  Parties], 
unless  the  protocol…also  mandates  new  specific 
scheduled  commitments…for  Developing  Country 
Parties within the same compliance period..." [54].
China  and  India  are  currently  responsible  for  al-
most 30% of global GHG emissions, and their emis-
sions are increasing at a faster rate than those of any 
other country (see, e.g., [55]).
Furthermore,  China  is  a  main  competitor  to  the 
United States in the global market, and there is wide-
spread concern among U.S. decision-makers that U.S. 
GHG emissions reduction measures that are not recip-
rocated, particularly by China, will put U.S. industries at 
a competitive disadvantage [56,57]. GHG emissions reg-
ulations encounter strong domestic  opposition  in the 
United States. The U.S. Senate has rejected legislative 
proposals  for  domestic  GHG  control  measures  three 
times (2003, 2005, and 2008). In 2009, federal climate 
legislation was adopted by the U.S. House of Represent-
atives, but the legislation was never put to a floor vote 
in the Senate and was thus never enacted as U.S. law.
This  lack  of  federal  climate  legislation  does  not 
mean that there are no actions in the United States to 
reduce GHG emissions. For instance, following a 2007 
Supreme  Court  decision  permitting  CO2 regulations 
under  the  Clean Air  Act,  the  Obama Administration 
instructed the U.S. Environmental  Protection Agency 
(EPA) to develop and enforce CO2 emissions regulations 
on both mobile (e.g., transportation) and permanent 
sources  (e.g.,  coal-fired  power  plants).  In  addition, 
there are several climate initiatives taking place at state 
level. The most important is the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas  Initiative  (RGGI),  an  emissions  trading  system 
that includes a number of states in the northeastern 
region of the country [57,58]). Finally, since ca. 2006 
we  have  seen  a  significant  decline  in  U.S.  energy-
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related CO2 emissions, a decline due to the shift from 
coal to gas following from the tremendous increase of 
shale gas in the U.S. energy mix for electricity produc-
tion  (e.g.,  see  [59]).  The national  and sub-national 
initiatives, however, will unlikely generate the required 
scope  of  emissions  reductions.  Moreover,  there  is 
currently limited political support for policy measures 
to ensure a permanent transition from coal to gas in 
U.S. electricity generation, such as a carbon tax or a 
similar policy measure [60]. The long-term effect of 
the U.S. "shale gas revolution" is thus uncertain. None 
of these initiatives and developments, therefore, en-
sures  the  legislative  foundation  required  for  U.S. 
ratification of a new climate agreement.
Were the United States to sign and ratify an agree-
ment to reduce GHG emissions, however, U.S. com-
mitments incorporated in the agreement would become 
part of "the supreme law of the land" and would thus 
be subject to the same strict compliance regime that 
governs all federal U.S. legislation (e.g., see [61,62]). 
In the United States, therefore, compliance is already 
enforced  in  the  federal  judicial  system.  The  United 
States thus often supports strong international mech-
anisms to enforce compliance and to make sure its 
international counterparts face similar provisions. For 
instance, in the negotiations over Kyoto's compliance 
system, the United States consistently supported strong 
enforcement ([63], pp. 24–26).
The  United  States  also  supports  enforcement  of 
ratification.  In the domestic  debate on GHG control 
measures, legislative proposals have invariably included 
measures that could be used to sanction nonparticipa-
tion, usually in the form of some kind of border tax. In 
the  United  States,  therefore,  it  is  not  enforcement 
mechanisms that generate opposition, but rather GHG 
control measures.
Given  the  major  positions  China  and  the  United 
States occupy in the world economy, a climate agree-
ment in which neither or just one of these key actors 
participates with deep commitments would not satisfy 
our  requirements  of  an  effective  agreement.  The 
United States and China, however, have been locked 
in a relationship of mutually incompatible positions at 
least since the late 1990s. China is not prepared to 
accept  deep  international  GHG  commitments  until 
developed  countries,  particularly  the  United  States, 
take on such commitments. The United States, on the 
other hand, is not prepared to take on international 
GHG reduction commitments unless major developing 
countries,  such  as  China,  do  so.  Given  these  key 
actors' dominant economies and their political positions 
on  the  climate  problem,  even  an  indirect  (gradual) 
approach  to  establishing  an  international  climate 
agreement  with  deep  commitments  and  potent  en-
forcement would likely be politically infeasible.
5. Conclusions
More than two decades of climate change negotiations 
have produced a series of climate agreements. Never-
theless, the negotiations have been largely unsuccessful, 
because  none of  these  agreements  has  contributed 
much to solving the climate change problem. We argue 
that  one  should  not  expect  future climate  change 
negotiations to directly or indirectly produce an effect-
ive agreement either. An argument consisting of four 
main elements supports this conclusion.
Firstly,  an  ambitious  agreement  will  likely  entail 
very  strong  incentives  for  free  riding.  In  particular, 
these incentives will be much stronger for an ambitious 
future climate agreement than the corresponding in-
centives for free riding in past, less ambitious climate 
agreements (Kyoto). They will also be much stronger 
than the incentives for free riding in ambitious IEAs in 
other issue areas (e.g., Montreal).
Secondly, curbing these strong incentives for free 
riding will require three types of potent enforcement: 
incentives  to  ensure  that  all  major  countries  ratify 
with  deep  commitments,  incentives  to  ensure  that 
ratifiers with deep commitments do not withdraw, and 
incentives to ensure that ratifiers with deep commit-
ments comply with them.
Thirdly, adoption of such three-fold potent enforce-
ment  will  almost  certainly  be  politically  infeasible 
within the UNFCCC, which operates under consensus 
rules  that  grant  veto  power  to  the  most  reluctant 
countries. Countries that are generally negative to an 
agreement  will  likely  oppose  potent  incentives  for 
ratification with deep commitments as well as potent 
incentives  against  withdrawal.  Moreover,  countries 
willing to participate with deep commitments but un-
certain about their own willingness or ability to imple-
ment  these  commitments  will  likely  oppose  potent 
enforcement of compliance. The larger the incentives 
for  free  riding  (the  deeper  the  commitments),  the 
larger the need for potent enforcement and the more 
likely that some countries will oppose such enforcement. 
Thus, while we agree with Barrett [17,20] that potent 
enforcement is essential for an effective climate agree-
ment, we are perhaps even less optimistic than he is 
concerning  the  likelihood  that  it  will  be  feasible  to 
incorporate potent enforcement measures in a future 
climate agreement.
Finally, a gradual approach that aims to reach an 
effective agreement indirectly and that is based on a 
more  limited  set  of  negotiating  parties outside the 
UNFCCC, will be unlikely to succeed either. While such 
a process may have some advantages in principle, a 
successful  outcome  requires  participation  by  both 
China and the United States. Unless they can somehow 
join  forces,  negotiations  will  be  no  more  likely  to 
succeed outside the UNFCCC than inside it.
The conclusion that global negotiations are likely to 
fail  is not new. Scholars and environmentalists alike 
regard global negotiations as likely to fail. For example, 
David Victor argues that climate diplomacy has yiel-
ded "the illusion of action but not much impact on the 
underlying problem" [37] and David Roberts argues 
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that "the notion that smaller groups than the UNFCCC 
are  needed for  serious  climate  negotiations  is  now 
practically conventional wisdom in developed countries" 
[64].  However, our analysis differs from theirs in at 
least two respects. Firstly, unlike Victor and Roberts, 
we argue that a more gradual approach is also likely 
to  fail.  Secondly,  unlike  them,  we  emphasize  that 
potent  enforcement  is  not  only  required to  make a 
climate agreement effective, but also highly unlikely to 
be politically feasible.
Readers  will  likely  consider  our  conclusions  as 
depressing news. However, in our view it is better to 
adjust the expectations of (and perhaps even the goal 
of) the climate change negotiations than to continue 
upholding  an  illusion  that  ambitious  goals  will  be 
achieved  eventually,  when  such  goals  are  in  fact 
politically  infeasible.  Only  by  developing  a  realistic 
view of the process and its prospects can we hope to 
get the best out of it.
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